Iran rejects UN-backed plan to free ships trapped in strait of Hormuz

What Happened

On Thursday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rejected UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Omani-proposed temporary shipping evacuation lanes through the Strait of Hormuz, calling them 'unacceptable and completely dangerous' and insisting that any transit must be coordinated with the IRGC navy. This rejection came despite a recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding in which Tehran agreed to ensure full freedom of navigation and no tolls for 60 days. The IMO and Oman had announced coordinates for two lanes—one north in mined Iranian waters and one south in Omani waters—to evacuate hundreds of trapped ships, but the IRGC statement indicated Iran did not agree to the routes. Mohammad Ghalibaf, Iran's parliament speaker, asserted that 'the administration of the strait of Hormuz will never go back to the way it was before the war,' referring to the combined US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February. Concurrently, Iran demands Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon as part of broader US-Iran talks, while Israel maintains it will not withdraw until Hezbollah is disarmed; a ceasefire has largely held but Israeli drone strikes continue. Oman and Iran have agreed to form a working party on the future administration of the strait, amid Gulf and Western opposition to potential tolls.

Key Actors

Why It Matters

Iran's rejection of internationally backed navigation lanes reinforces the Strait of Hormuz as a critical bargaining chip in high-stakes negotiations over sanctions relief and its nuclear program, threatening global shipping and violating UNCLOS principles. It undermines Oman's mediation, Saudi-led regional normalization efforts, and the fragile US-Iran diplomatic track, while the parallel Lebanon standoff adds pressure and risk of escalation.

Watch For

The 60-day US-Iran MoU period and any further IRGC-imposed restrictions; the work of the Iran-Oman working party on strait administration; IMO and UN reactions to Iran's rejection; developments in Israeli-Lebanese talks and Israel's military presence in southern Lebanon; Gulf state and Saudi responses to toll proposals, particularly any shift towards conditional acceptance.