Sudan’s War of Partition— sAF, RSF, Darfur, and the Collapse of the State

Sudan’s civil war is no longer only a contest between two commanders. It is the violent breakup of a state into competing military economies, territorial zones, and foreign-backed networks.

The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces began fighting over the transition and the future of RSF integration. By May 2026, that power struggle has produced famine, mass displacement, ethnic targeting, and a de facto partition between SAF- and RSF-dominated areas.

Darfur is the warning sign. The RSF’s campaign there revives the same atrocity patterns that defined the earlier Darfur genocide: ethnic targeting, mass killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and destruction of civilian survival systems.

The conflict matters globally because it combines several extreme risks:

• Largest displacement crisis: Millions have fled inside Sudan and across borders.
• Famine and aid obstruction: Hunger is not incidental; it is shaped by siege, looting, blocked aid, and destroyed livelihoods.
• Genocide risk: Darfur remains the center of mass atrocity warnings.
• Proxy warfare: External backers are helping sustain the war even as diplomats call for peace.
• Regional collapse corridor: Sudan links the Sahel, Horn of Africa, Red Sea, Egypt, Libya, Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Sudan’s current war is rooted in post-independence governance failures, military rule, regional inequality, and the long-term marginalization of communities outside the political center.

Since independence, Sudan’s rulers have often concentrated power and wealth in Khartoum while neglecting or violently suppressing peripheral regions such as Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, eastern Sudan, and the south.

The Civil Wars and South Sudan

Sudan gained independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956.

Almost immediately, the country entered cycles of civil war.

The first two major civil wars, from 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005, were driven by disputes over religion, ethnicity, resources, governance, and the domination of the south by the Arabized political center in the north.

These wars culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which created a pathway for South Sudanese self-determination.

In 2011, South Sudan seceded after a referendum.

The secession removed around 75% of Sudan’s oil resources, severely weakening Sudan’s economy and intensifying elite competition over remaining sources of revenue.

The Darfur Genocide

In 2003, non-Arab rebel groups in Darfur, including the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, rose up against the government of President Omar al-Bashir.

They accused the state of systematic discrimination, neglect, and violence against Darfur’s non-Arab communities.

In response, Bashir’s government armed and mobilized Arab militias known as the Janjaweed.

The campaign in Darfur involved:

• Mass killings
• Village burnings
• Rape and sexual violence
• Forced displacement
• Destruction of livelihoods
• Targeted attacks on non-Arab communities

An estimated 300,000 people were killed and millions displaced.

The United States declared the violence genocide, and the International Criminal Court later indicted Omar al-Bashir.

In 2013, remnants of the Janjaweed were formalized into the Rapid Support Forces, giving Hemedti a national paramilitary command and laying the foundation for the current war.

The 2019 Revolution and 2021 Coup

In late 2018, mass protests erupted across Sudan over bread prices, economic hardship, corruption, and decades of authoritarian rule.

In April 2019, the military removed Omar al-Bashir after months of civilian protests.

A transitional government was formed, sharing power between civilian leaders and military commanders.

However, the transition was fragile from the beginning.

In October 2021, the SAF and RSF jointly staged a coup, dissolving the civilian-led government and derailing Sudan’s democratic transition.

The alliance between Burhan and Hemedti was tactical, not stable. By 2023, tensions over power-sharing and RSF integration into the national army became impossible to contain.

Sudan has seen repeated peace agreements, but many have failed because they prioritized elite bargains over structural reform, civilian rule, accountability, and inclusive governance.

The Juba Peace Agreement

The Juba Peace Agreement was signed in October 2020 between Sudan’s transitional government and several rebel groups.

It aimed to address conflicts in:

• Darfur
• South Kordofan
• Blue Nile
• Other marginalized regions

The agreement included provisions for:

• Rebel representation in transitional institutions
• Wealth sharing
• Security arrangements
• Integration of fighters into national forces
• Transitional justice mechanisms
• Greater regional autonomy and representation

For Darfur, the agreement included a commitment to allocate 40% of national revenue to the region.

Why the Agreement Failed

The Juba Peace Agreement did not produce lasting stability.

Several major problems weakened it:

• Important rebel factions refused to sign.
• Civilian revolutionary groups were sidelined.
• Security-sector reform remained unresolved.
• Militia integration was delayed.
• Military elites retained decisive power.
• Accountability for past atrocities remained weak.
• Regional grievances were not structurally resolved.

The most dangerous unresolved issue was the status of the RSF.

During negotiations in late 2022 and early 2023, Burhan pushed for faster RSF integration under SAF command. Hemedti demanded a much longer timeline and continued autonomy.

This dispute triggered the outbreak of full-scale war on April 15, 2023.

As of May 2026, Sudan is divided into zones of military control, with humanitarian conditions collapsing and diplomacy largely paralyzed.

Khartoum and Central Sudan

In late 2024 and early 2025, the SAF launched major offensives to retake the capital region.

The SAF reportedly:

• Expelled RSF forces from parts of Omdurman
• Recaptured Bahri
• Secured key oil refineries
• Began reestablishing government institutions in Khartoum
• Shifted some administrative functions back from Port Sudan

However, the capital remains devastated.

Khartoum has suffered massive destruction of homes, hospitals, markets, government buildings, bridges, and basic infrastructure.

The city that once functioned as Sudan’s political and economic center has become a symbol of state collapse.

Darfur and Kordofan

The RSF has consolidated near-total control over Darfur.

In October 2025, the RSF captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, after an 18-month siege.

The fall of El Fasher triggered reports of:

• Mass executions
• Ethnic targeting
• Rampant sexual violence
• Forced displacement
• Attacks on Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit communities
• Destruction of civilian neighborhoods
• Obstruction of humanitarian access

UN investigators concluded that some of these acts were committed with genocidal intent.

After consolidating control in Darfur, the RSF pushed into Kordofan.

The group captured the Heglig oil field and besieged towns such as Kadugli and Dilling, threatening state revenues, civilian lives, and Sudan’s remaining economic infrastructure.

Diplomatic Front

Diplomatic efforts remain deeply stalled.

Earlier initiatives in Jeddah and Geneva failed to secure a durable ceasefire.

In April 2026, the international community convened the Third International Sudan Conference in Berlin.

The conference reportedly:

• Raised more than €1.3 billion in aid pledges
• Adopted the Berlin Principles
• Called for a civilian-led transition
• Demanded an end to external support for the warring factions
• Urged expanded humanitarian access

However, the conference was heavily criticized.

The SAF and RSF were not invited. Some states accused of fueling the war were present. The SAF dismissed the initiative as foreign interference and “colonial tutelage.”

The result was a diplomatic process with money, statements, and principles — but no enforceable ceasefire.

That is the core failure.

Humanitarian Impact

Sudan is facing one of the gravest humanitarian crises in the world.

Reported impacts include:

• An estimated death toll exceeding 150,000 people
• More than 14 million people displaced
• Around 9.5 million internally displaced persons
• More than 4 million refugees fleeing to neighboring countries
• Nearly 34 million people requiring humanitarian assistance
• Famine confirmed in multiple areas
• Over 70% of health facilities in conflict zones non-functional
• Widespread disease outbreaks, including cholera
• Large-scale sexual violence and ethnic targeting
• Systematic obstruction of humanitarian aid

The humanitarian crisis is not only the result of battlefield violence.

It is also driven by deliberate starvation tactics, aid blockages, looting, destruction of agriculture, collapse of healthcare, and attacks on civilian survival systems.

Darfur remains the epicenter of atrocity risk.

The targeting of Masalit, Fur, Zaghawa, and other non-Arab communities has revived fears that Sudan is witnessing a continuation of the genocide first seen in the early 2000s.

Economic Impact

Sudan’s economy has collapsed.

Key reported effects include:

• Disruption of agriculture and food production
• Destruction and looting of markets, factories, banks, and homes
• Collapse of the banking system
• Loss of roughly half of banking-sector capital
• Competing currencies and financial systems in rival-controlled areas
• Inflation reaching extreme levels
• RSF control over important gold mines
• SAF dependence on remaining state institutions and external support
• Halted or disrupted oil production after fighting around Heglig
• Massive decline in household purchasing power

Agriculture is especially important.

Sudan was already vulnerable before the war, but fighting in Gezira, Darfur, Kordofan, and other agricultural areas has undermined food production during a period of mass hunger.

The collapse of markets and transport routes has turned food availability into a weapon.

Geopolitical Impact

The war has destabilized Sudan’s entire neighborhood.

Major geopolitical effects include:

• Large refugee flows into Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, and Central African Republic
• Rising pressure on already fragile border regions
• Involvement of regional powers backing rival factions
• Accusations that the UAE has supported the RSF
• Egyptian and Iranian support for the SAF
• Russian and Wagner-linked interests around gold and military networks
• Reports of foreign mercenaries fighting alongside the RSF
• Weakening of UN and African Union mediation efforts
• Greater risk of Red Sea and Sahel instability

Sudan’s geography makes collapse especially dangerous.

It links the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, North Africa, and the Red Sea. A prolonged failed-state scenario could create space for arms trafficking, extremist groups, smuggling networks, and cross-border militia activity.

The Sudan conflict is not just an internal power struggle.

It is a profound failure of the international security architecture involving:

• Genocide and mass atrocities
• State collapse
• Proxy warfare
• Food insecurity
• Forced displacement
• Aid obstruction
• Democratic reversal
• Resource predation
• Regional destabilization
• The collapse of civilian governance

The central danger is the permanent fragmentation of Sudan.

If the SAF and RSF consolidate rival zones of control, Sudan could become a Libya-style fractured state, with competing governments, war economies, foreign-backed armed groups, and no single sovereign authority.

The war has also destroyed the democratic hopes of the 2019 revolution.

Grassroots civilian networks, including Emergency Response Rooms, have been forced to shift from political organizing to basic survival work: food distribution, medical aid, evacuation, and shelter.

Unless external sponsors stop fueling the war and Sudanese civilians regain a path toward political authority, the conflict may permanently reshape the demographics, borders, and security architecture of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.