How Gaza economic mafia is a threat to Israel

What Happened

Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, Israeli military and security authorities have reportedly restricted commercial imports into the Gaza Strip to an exclusive list of 13 individuals. The latest list, said to have been approved by Israel in October 2025, includes Mustafa Eid, Mohammed al-Khazendar, Mohammad al-Barqi, Riyad Daoud, Mohammad Dardasawi, Muhannad Abu Halloub, Sameh Othman, Raed Abu Murai, Ayada al-Rifi, Mohammad al-Khodari, Bakr Abu Halima, Suhail Abu Halima, and Mahmoud Abu Murai. According to testimony from numerous Gaza merchants, these individuals do not function as genuine importers but act as intermediaries, charging commissions of NIS 150,000 to NIS 400,000 per truck to coordinate imports with Israeli authorities. As a result, established merchants with decades of experience have been excluded, and the cost of essential goods—food, medicine, fuel, and construction materials—has risen sharply for Gaza’s civilians. The system, described by the article’s author (a Fatah reform advocate) as an ‘economic mafia,’ is alleged to have created black markets and concentrated extraordinary wealth among a small group, while Israel’s strategic objective of weakening extremist organizations and fostering stability is undermined.

Key Actors

Why It Matters

The monopolistic import system risks creating a new class of economic beneficiaries whose interests may align with preserving the monopoly and ongoing instability, directly undermining Israel’s stated goal of weakening extremism and enabling post-war reconstruction. It weakens Gaza’s legitimate private sector, inflates prices during a humanitarian crisis, and fosters corruption and black markets. Historical patterns suggest such wartime economic monopolies can evolve into powerful political and security networks, potentially generating long-term threats to both Palestinian civil society and Israeli security.

Watch For

Potential investigative reports by Israeli media into the selection process, oversight, and financial flows of the import authorization system, as called for by the article’s author. Any response from Israeli authorities regarding the criteria for the list, possible revision of the import coordination mechanism, or statements from international bodies on the economic dimensions of the Gaza crisis. Also monitor whether renewed hostilities or ceasefire negotiations lead to changes in commercial access points (e.g., Rafah crossing) that could disrupt or alter the current monopoly.